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INTRODUCTION 
I begin with a story which may sound familiar.  Following election 
reforms in North Carolina, African American voter turnout surges, set-
ting records.  The North Carolina legislature then changes hands, and 
the new party in power, which has few, if any, African American sup-
porters, passes new voting restrictions that make it very difficult for 
African Americans to vote.  Turnout plummets in the state, cratering 
among African American voters. 
The story is true.  The year was not 2008 — when African Ameri-
can voters helped North Carolina’s electoral votes go to Democrat 
Barack Obama before a new Republican legislature (in 2013) passed a 
tough set of voting rules — but 1900, and the party doing the disen-
franchising was not the Republican Party but the Democratic Party.  
Professor J. Morgan Kousser in his path-breaking 1974 book, The 
Shaping of Southern Politics, tells the compelling story of African 
American disenfranchisement at the beginning of the last century.1 
North Carolina had “perhaps the most democratic”2 political sys-
tem in the late–nineteenth century South, with very high turnout 
among adult males, with black men voting in large numbers, and 
without the extensive ballot-box stuffing and election fraud that had 
been occurring in most other Southern states.  Back then, of course, 
African American voters supported the Republican Party, the party of 
Lincoln.  Republicans had strong black support in the state, but their 
white support was largely limited to hill and mountain areas, as racist 
white voters in much of the state would not vote for a party supported 
by blacks.  Populists put up their own candidates and gained some 
support.  Republicans and Populists put up a joint, or fused, set of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 2 Id. at 183. 
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candidates by the mid-1890s, and they captured the North Carolina 
legislature from Democrats in 1894. 
Then, as now, North Carolina was a closely divided partisan state, 
and state laws changed as the parties changed power.  Along with 
adopting a more progressive legislative agenda, the fused Republican-
Populists passed major election reforms, reversing earlier Democratic 
laws that suppressed African American turnout.  Kousser says that 
North Carolina had “probably the fairest and most democratic election 
law in the post-Reconstruction South.”3  The new laws required ap-
pointment of neutral election judges, smaller precincts, limitations on 
registrars’ ability to disqualify voters, tougher standards to challenge 
voters, and colored ballots with symbols to help illiterate voters cast 
effective ballots. 
The reforms worked: turnout hit a whopping 85.4% of eligible vot-
ers in 1896, black turnout was the highest in any southern election 
since 1876, Republicans got their first North Carolina governor since 
Reconstruction, and the fused Republican-Populist parties increased 
their majorities.  African American George H. White was elected to 
Congress from North Carolina.  But Congressman White would be the 
last African American member of Congress from the South until 1972 
and the last from North Carolina until 1992 (with the election of Mel 
Watt and Eva Clayton).4 
There was a backlash against African American success.  Demo-
crats resorted to violence and fraud in 1898, and the Republican-
Populist coalition became strained, including in disputes over racial 
policies.  Democrats took over the state legislature, and their first or-
der of business was to reverse the election reforms in order to ease the 
passage of a state constitutional amendment to disenfranchise African 
American voters.  The Raleigh News and Observer editorialized in fa-
vor of reversing the election reforms, stating that the legislature should 
“make it impossible for any element of white voters to appeal to the 
Negro voters upon any public question.”5  The purpose of the reforms 
was to disenfranchise blacks and lower-class whites.  Democrats’ new 
election law changed Election Day from November to August.  It re-
quired all voters to register anew and gave registrars discretion to ex-
clude voters.  “Finally,” Kousser explains, “the law provided that any 
ballot placed in the wrong box — there were six — whether by elec-
tion officers or the voter himself, would be void.”6 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 Id. at 187. 
 4 See People Search, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, 
http://history.house.gov/People/Search (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).  
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ple, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan 20, 1899, at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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With the new election law in place, the fight, which got ugly, 
turned to the plebiscite over the disenfranchising state constitutional 
amendment.7  Former Member of Congress Alfred Moore Waddell told 
a crowd the day before the election: “You are Anglo-Saxons.  You are 
armed and prepared, and you will do your duty. . . . Go to the polls to-
morrow, and if you find the negro out voting, tell him to leave the 
polls, and if he refuses, kill him.”8 
Thanks to fraud, intimidation, violence, and racial animus, the 
amendment passed.  Afterward, overall voter turnout in North Caroli-
na plummeted and African American turnout dried up completely.  
Eventually, the state Republican Party gave up on African Americans 
— now disenfranchised and unable to support the Party — seeing 
them as what Kousser terms “a lost and damaging cause.”9 
The fight in 1900 was about race — and it was about partisan poli-
tics.  You could not separate the two: racial politics affected the com-
position of the political parties, and parties engaged in racial politics in 
part for partisan ends.  The story Kousser tells is a story of race and 
party: the only way to understand it fully is to see the complexity and 
interaction between these forces. 
Fast forward to 2013 and the new fight in North Carolina over 
House Bill 589, which has gotten national attention.10  The law was 
passed by a new Republican legislature over staunch Democratic ob-
jections following a Democratic presidential victory in 2008 and a 
closely contested 2012 presidential race.  It includes a strict 
voter identification provision.  The law also cuts a week off early vot-
ing in the state (used by up to seventy percent of African American 
voters in 2012) and bars local election boards from keeping the polls 
open on the final Saturday before the election after 1:00 PM.  It keeps 
the same number of hours on a fewer number of days.  It eliminates 
same-day voter registration.  It opens up the precincts to “challengers,” 
who can gum up the works at polling places and dissuade voters from 
showing up in the first place.  It bans paying voter registration–card 
circulators by the piece.  It eliminates preregistration of sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds in high schools.  It provides that a voter who votes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 The amendment imposed a poll tax and literacy test, with a grandfather clause.  For the 
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-newsouth/4365 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 8 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW 110–11 (1996) (alteration in 
original) (quoting The North Carolina Race Conflict, 60 THE OUTLOOK (New York, N.Y.) 707, 
708 (1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9 KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 195. 
 10 For the text of the law, see H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at 
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in the wrong precinct (perhaps because of a poll worker’s error) will 
have her whole ballot thrown out (earlier law had allowed such ballots 
to count for those races in which the voter was eligible to vote). 
Like the fights in 1900, today’s fight over North Carolina’s contro-
versial new voting law is about race and party politics.  In this way, it 
is nothing new.  But thanks to how the U.S. Supreme Court has con-
ceived of the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and how Congress has 
defined racial politics in the Voting Rights Act of 1965,11 we may be 
forced to choose: race or party? 
The realignment of the parties in the South following the Civil 
Rights movement of the 1960s has created a reality in which today 
most African American voters are Democrats and most white con-
servative voters are Republicans.  That was not the case back in 1900 
or before the Civil Rights movement, when Southern Democrats were 
conservative and Northern Democrats were more liberal.  The Voting 
Rights Act, when passed, was not seen as a law that helped the Demo-
cratic Party — quite the opposite.  But today, many Republicans view 
the Voting Rights Act as a law that favors Democrats, especially with 
a Democratic and African American President and Attorney General 
administering the law. 
When party and race coincide, as they did in 1900 and they do to-
day, it is much harder to separate racial and partisan intent and effect.  
Today, white voters in the South are overwhelmingly Republican and, 
in some of the Southern states, are less likely to be willing to vote for a 
black candidate than are white voters in the rest of the country.12  The 
Democratic Party supports a left-leaning platform that includes more 
social assistance to the poor and higher taxes.  Some Republicans view 
such plans as aiding racial minorities. 
Given the overlap of considerations of race and party, when a Re-
publican legislature like North Carolina’s passes a law making it hard-
er for some voters to vote, is that a law about party politics or a law 
about race? 
As I explain, if courts call this a law about party politics and view 
it through the lens of partisan competition, then the law is more likely 
to stand and the fight over it will be waged at the ballot box.  If courts 
call this a law about race and view it through the lens of the struggle 
over race and voting rights, then the law is likely to fall and the fight 
will be settled primarily in courts. 
This contrast was on display in a brief that the State of Texas re-
cently filed in its fight with the U.S. Department of Justice over 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 12 See Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in 
Racial Polarization in the 2012 Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 208 (2013). 
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whether to put Texas back under federal voting supervision.  The Jus-
tice Department argues that proof of intentional racial discrimination 
in voting is found in Texas’s recent redistricting plan, which disfavors 
minority voters and officeholders.  Texas’s defense is that its law is 
about partisan politics, not about race, and it is therefore acceptable: 
DOJ’s accusations of racial discrimination are baseless.  In 2011, both 
houses of the Texas Legislature were controlled by large Republican ma-
jorities, and their redistricting decisions were designed to increase the Re-
publican Party’s electoral prospects at the expense of the Democrats.  It is 
perfectly constitutional for a Republican-controlled legislature to make 
partisan districting decisions, even if there are incidental effects on minori-
ty voters who support Democratic candidates.13 
Note that Texas’s defense is that it was deliberately passing its law 
“at the expense of Democrats.”  Leave aside for a moment the fact that 
discriminating on the basis of political party should serve as an in-
dictment rather than a defense of Texas’s policy.  Instead, note the bi-
furcation of race and party.  To Texas, there is just an “incidental” ef-
fect on minority voters.  If Texas is right that party discrimination is a 
valid defense under the law, but that racial discrimination violates the 
Voting Rights Act, then courts need to make a distinction: race or  
party? 
The race versus party bifurcation is unhelpful, and the solution to 
these new battles over election rules — what I call “the Voting Wars” 
— is going to have to come from the federal courts.  Courts should ap-
ply a more rigorous standard to review arguably discriminatory voting 
laws.  When a legislature passes an election-administration law (out-
side of the redistricting context) discriminating against a party’s voters 
or otherwise burdening voters, that fact should not be a defense.  In-
stead, courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause to require the legislature to produce substantial evidence 
that it has a good reason for burdening voters and that its means are 
closely connected to achieving those ends.  The achievement of parti-
san ends would not be considered a good reason (as it appears to be in 
the redistricting context).  This rule would both discourage party pow-
er grabs and protect voting rights of minority voters.  In short, it 
would inhibit discrimination on the basis of both race and party, and 
protect all voters from unnecessary burdens on the right to vote. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(c) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act at 19, Perez v. Texas, No. 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013), 
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Texas-reply-on-Sec.-3-of 
-VRA-8-5-13.pdf.  
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I.  NORTH CAROLINA AS PART OF THE VOTING WARS 
It is easy to situate North Carolina’s law in the context of a nation-
al battle we have witnessed since 2000 over the rules for running our 
elections.  I have told the story many times before14 and will not dwell 
on it here.  The last decade has included great partisan battles over the 
rules for running our elections.  Voter identification laws, for example, 
have been passed along partisan lines, with Republicans supporting 
them in the name of fraud prevention and Democrats blasting them in 
the name of voter suppression.  There is virtually no impersonation 
fraud which a voter identification law would prevent, but it also ap-
pears that Democrats have exaggerated the extent to which these laws 
disenfranchise eligible voters who want to vote.15 
The latest wave of Republican-led laws, however, may be increas-
ing the burden on voters.  While some of the early voter identification 
laws were not that onerous, Texas’s and North Carolina’s laws appear 
to make it more difficult to vote by accepting fewer forms of ID for 
voting and, in Texas’s case, offering fewer (and more distant) locations 
at which a person can obtain a “free” voter identification card.  Other 
North Carolina changes, such as eliminating same-day voter registra-
tion and preventing the counting of ballots cast in a wrong precinct, 
may have an even larger effect on voter registration and turnout than 
the identification laws. 
Judged through a partisan lens then, North Carolina’s law is just 
the latest Republican attempt to skew the electorate at least moderate-
ly to gain electoral advantage. 
II.  NORTH CAROLINA AS PART OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE 
I turn the lens from partisan politics to race and back to the 1965 
passage of the Voting Rights Act.  The Voting Rights Act first sus-
pended and then later banned literacy tests and other voting rules.  
The ban on tests, combined with the presence of federal observers, 
mattered a great deal at the beginning.  Over time, the preclearance 
provision became the most significant piece of the Act.  Under this 
provision, a state or locality covered by section 5 had the burden to 
prove that any change in voting rules that it proposed would not have 
the effect, and was not enacted with the purpose, of making minority 
voters worse off. 
The Voting Rights Act has been very successful.  Although the per-
centage of objections was never high, because so many voting changes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 I tell it in most detail in RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS (2012).  On the extent 
and veracity of claims of voter fraud and suppression, see chapters 2 and 3.  Id. at 41–104. 
 15 See id. 
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were submitted (everything from a ten-year redistricting plan to mov-
ing a polling place across the street) there were over 2000 objections 
between 1969 and 1989.16  Racial gaps in voter registration fell.  The 
number of minority officeholders grew, especially after Congress ex-
panded the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to include a new section 2, 
which mandated the creation of new majority-minority districts across 
the country.  In the seven originally covered section 5 states, there 
were fewer than 100 black elected officials in 1975.  That number rose 
to 3265 in 1989.  In six states with especially large Hispanic concentra-
tions, the number of Hispanic officeholders increased from 1280 to 
3592 in 1990.17 
The greatest significance of the law in recent years has been to give 
minority voters a bargaining chip — a chance to sit at the table and 
express concerns about proposed voting rules.18  The Justice Depart-
ment has brought in minority voters into investigations and into nego-
tiations with covered jurisdictions over proposed voting rules.  Cov-
ered jurisdictions changed their laws to ease the impact on minority 
voters. 
A nice recent example of this comes from South Carolina, which 
passed a voter identification law, one that was not quite as strict as 
Texas’s.  South Carolina’s law allowed election officials to accommo-
date voters who had “reasonable impediment[s]” that prevented them 
from getting the type of photo identification needed for voting.19  The 
Justice Department still objected, as did legal organizations represent-
ing minority voters.20  And because of section 5, South Carolina had 
the burden of showing that the voter identification requirement did 
not discriminate.21  As the Justice Department’s case against South 
Carolina proceeded, the state watered down its law, making it easier 
for people without photo identification to vote by expanding the “rea-
sonable impediment” provision.22  The court eventually approved 
South Carolina’s law for use in 2013, but only because section 5 
spurred those changes.  As Judge John Bates observed: “Without the 
review process under the Voting Rights Act, South Carolina’s voter 
photo ID law certainly would have been more restrictive.”23 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 168–69 (5th ed. 2012).  
 17 Id. at 203. 
 18 Richard L. Hasen, What’s Lost If the Voting Rights Act Falls?, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2013, 5:42 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/01/voting_rights_act_what 
_s_lost_if_the_supreme_court_kills_it.html.  
 19 See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 20 See id. at 38. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id. at 35–36. 
 23 Id. at 53–54 (Bates, J., concurring). 
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A different federal court blocked Texas’s new voter identification 
law.24  Its reasoning was simple: voter identification laws dispropor-
tionately affect the poor in Texas, like those voters who would have to 
travel up to 250 miles at their own expense to the county seat to get 
the so-called “free” voter identification.25  African Americans and La-
tinos are disproportionately poor in Texas, and therefore Texas could 
not demonstrate under the section 5 standard that the law would not 
make minority voters worse off. 
Whatever impact these laws are going to have, their burdens are 
going to fall hardest on the poor and the less educated.  To the extent 
that the vestiges of past discrimination mean that the poor will dispro-
portionately include minority voters, section 5 assured that at least in 
covered jurisdictions these new burdensome laws would not make mi-
nority voters worse off.  But the covered states objected.  Texas in ef-
fect argued: “Why should we have to get federal approval before we 
implement a voter identification law when a state like Indiana or 
Pennsylvania can implement a voter identification law without getting 
such permission?” 
This past summer, the Supreme Court agreed.  States and jurisdic-
tions that were covered under the section 5 preclearance rule were 
those with a history of racial discrimination in voting, as measured by 
a formula based in part on voter turnout statistics from 1964, 1968, or 
1972.  Section 5 was supposed to be temporary, but Congress kept 
reauthorizing it without updating this coverage formula.  The most re-
cent update occurred in 2006, when Congress renewed preclearance for 
another twenty-five years.26  In 2009, the Supreme Court issued an 
opinion warning that section 5 was in danger of being struck down as 
an encroachment on states’ rights,27 but Congress did nothing to up-
date the coverage formula.28  Then in 2013, on a 5-4 party line vote, 
the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder29 held that the cover-
age formula’s use was unconstitutional, because it treat the covered ju-
risdictions unfairly in violation of their rights to “equal sovereignty.”30  
Although Congress might be able to pass a new coverage formula 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (mem.). 
 25 Id. at 139–40. 
 26 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013). 
 27 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511–13 
(2009). 
 28 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628. 
 29 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
 30 Id. at 2623; see also id. at 2623–24. 
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which would meet the Supreme Court’s test — I am doubtful about 
that31 — there is no political will in Congress to do so. 
The loss of section 5 and the passage of new restrictive voting laws 
by states such as Texas and North Carolina in response has led the 
Justice Department to challenge Texas’s and North Carolina’s rules, 
under provisions of the Voting Rights Act that were not challenged in 
Shelby County.32  Section 2 of the Act, which applies nationwide, al-
lows minority voters to sue for denial or abridgement of the right to 
vote on account of race.33  The language of the section provides that 
one can prove denial or abridgement by showing that the political pro-
cesses leading to the nomination or election of officials in the state are 
not equally open to protected minority members, in that minority vot-
ers have “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to par-
ticipate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.”34 
Section 2 has been extremely successful in the redistricting context, 
causing the creation of many majority-minority districts.  But courts 
have not read section 2 widely in the context of nonredistricting 
measures, such as voter identification requirements or restrictions on 
early voting.35  Unlike section 5, the burden here is on the challengers, 
not on the state, to disprove discriminatory effect.  And unlike section 
5, courts do not compare the old law to the new law; instead, courts 
compare the law in place to the abstract principles of nondiscrimina-
tion contained in the language of section 2. 
Thus far, section 2 has not been a successful tool to challenge these 
laws, and unless courts change course it likely will not work now.  
Concededly, there have been few section 2 cases considering applica-
tion of the provision to voter identification laws.36  However, if lower 
courts do change course and start holding that section 2 covers things 
like voter identification laws with a discriminatory effect, the Supreme 
Court could hold that section 2 is unconstitutional on the grounds that 
it exceeds congressional power and encroaches on states’ rights along 
the lines of the reasoning in Shelby County. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 I explain the reasons in Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2291612.  
 32 For documents related to Texas, see Litigation: United States v. Texas, ELECTION L. @ 
MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/USv.Texas.php (last updated Aug.  
27, 2013, 11:08 AM).  For documents related to North Carolina, see Litigation: United States v. 
North Carolina, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation 
/UnitedStatesV.NorthCarolina.php (last updated Oct. 10, 2013, 8:52 AM).  
 33 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006 & Supp. V. 2011). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights 
Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 708–09 (2006). 
 36 Id. at 709.  
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The other provision that the Department of Justice is relying upon 
is section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.  This provision gives courts dis-
cretion to impose preclearance on a state or locality that has recently 
been guilty of intentional race discrimination in voting.37  It is discre-
tionary; even if the Justice Department could prove intention, a court 
need not impose preclearance and even if it does, it can limit preclear-
ance to particular changes or to a short period of time.  The section 3 
standard is tougher than both the section 5 and section 2 standards.  
How will the Department show that a state has discriminated on the 
basis of race, particularly when the state defends and says: “We were 
acting in good faith in passing our laws for good reasons, or at worst 
we were discriminating on the basis of party, not race?” 
That is Texas’s argument and could well be North Carolina’s, alt-
hough the latter is more likely to defend itself by claiming that its laws 
are necessary to prevent fraud or to promote efficiency.  Texas may 
have a hard time defending itself against charges of intentional racism, 
because just a few years ago a federal court held that Texas did engage 
in intentional racial discrimination in its 2011 redistricting plan when, 
among other things, it cut the “economic guts” out of Black Democrat-
ic legislators’ districts but not white Democratic legislators’ districts.38  
We will see what kind of evidence the Justice Department produces of 
intentional racial discrimination in North Carolina.  It is also unclear 
if courts will infer discriminatory intent based upon discriminatory ef-
fects.39  And once again, if any court actually reimposes preclearance 
on Texas or North Carolina under section 3, the Supreme Court could 
reverse under Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle.  Texas ar-
gues in its briefs that it is unconstitutional to impose preclearance un-
less a state’s racist conduct is as bad as what existed in 1965, when 
Congress first passed the Voting Rights Act.40 
III.  RACE OR PARTY?  YES 
I turn now to address the race-or-party question head-on.  Recall 
Texas’s defense to the attack on its redistricting plan: this is about par-
ty, rather than race.  But the lines between the two are inextricably  
intertwined. 
To illustrate, consider another aspect of North Carolina history.  In 
the 1990s, the state legislature was still controlled by Democrats, and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).  
 38 Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 160 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2885 
(2013) (mem); see also id. at 160–61. 
 39 See LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 179 (discussing the factors laid out 
in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)). 
 40 Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(c) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
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redistricting was still subject to preclearance from the Justice Depart-
ment.41  North Carolina had a long history of racial discrimination in 
its redistricting plans, and North Carolina knew it was going to have 
to do more to foster minority representation to avoid Voting Rights Act 
liability. 
The 1990s process of redistricting was brutal and political.  Demo-
crats passed a congressional plan with just one majority-minority dis-
trict, and the Justice Department, then under the control of the first 
Bush Justice Department, demanded the creation of a second district 
to satisfy the requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Re-
publicans thought this requirement would work to their advantage, as 
the packing of African-American voters into two districts would lead 
to more districts with a majority of Republican voters, helping give 
Republicans a majority in the Congressional delegation. 
Democrats, still controlling the redistricting process, nonetheless 
created two majority-minority districts of quite unusual shapes.  One 
of these districts ran 160 miles down I-85 from Durham to Charlotte.  
The Supreme Court noted: “At one point the district remains contigu-
ous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts 
before crossing over them.  One state legislator has remarked that ‘[i]f 
you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d kill 
most of the people in the district.”42  The initial Republican objection 
to this plan was that it was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.  
Republican plaintiffs, led by controversial conservative political player 
Art Pope,43 claimed it is unconstitutional to draw district lines to hurt 
one political party.44 
The courts, however, rejected a partisan gerrymandering claim.  
The Supreme Court in the 1986 case Davis v. Bandemer45 had made it 
very hard to bring claims based upon discrimination on the basis of 
party in redistricting, and more recently made bringing such claims 
even harder in Vieth v. Jubelirer.46  The Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides no standard 
for separating unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders from permissi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 For the history of North Carolina’s 1990s redistricting, see generally J. MORGAN 
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available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/10/111010fa_fact_mayer.  
 44 See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395, 397 (W.D.N.C.), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992) (mem). 
 45 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 46 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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ble consideration of party, rendering all partisan gerrymandering 
claims losers.47 
After the party-based claim challenging North Carolina’s redistrict-
ing failed, opponents argued that the districting plan constituted an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.  In the 1993 case of Shaw v.  
Reno,48 the Supreme Court agreed, holding that when voters are sepa-
rated on the basis of race into districts without adequate justification, 
this separation violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  This was not a claim of vote dilution, but one based upon 
what Professor Richard Pildes has called expressive harms49: the prob-
lem, the Court said, was the message the district shapes sent to voters 
that race is all that matters in politics.50 
Shaw was controversial, and the Supreme Court heard an unprece-
dented four challenges to North Carolina’s districts within the next 
decade.  The last challenge was the most interesting.  In Easley v. 
Cromartie,51 the Court held that the crazy-shaped district lines in the 
latest North Carolina plan were not unconstitutional because they 
were designed to protect party, not to divide on the basis of race.52 
Easley is the origin of Texas’s argument that it should be able to 
pass its tough redistricting law because the law was motivated by par-
ty rather than race.  Yet is hard to credit Texas’s explanation that the 
redistricting’s effect on racial minorities is merely “incidental” if it tar-
geted the Democratic Party.  Consider the local Republican official in 
North Carolina who recently told The Daily Show not only that if the 
state’s new voter identification law will hurt “a bunch of lazy blacks 
that wants the government to give them everything — so be it,” but 
also that “the law is going to kick the Democrats in the butt.”53 
The “Race or Party?” question is an artificial way of dividing up a 
world that has been dictated by American law and the Supreme Court.  
Why artificial?  Part of the reason that the Democratic Party appeals 
to minority voters is that it supports policies that benefit minority vot-
ers.  It is hard to think of discrimination against Democrats as having 
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 47 See id. at 291 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the  
judgment).  
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 51 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
 52 Id. at 257. 
 53 Suppressing the Vote, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www 
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a mere “incidental” effect on minority voters, given the significant 
overlap between the two groups.  On the flip side, part of the Republi-
can opposition to Democratic policies is that they are more redistribu-
tive, and that redistribution helps racial minorities who are dispropor-
tionately poor. 
Republican operative Lee Atwater explained in 1981 how the Re-
publican Party could appeal to racists without appearing racist itself 
by moving from explicit racial appeals to talking about forced busing, 
cutting taxes, and supporting other economic policies in which “blacks 
get hurt worse than whites.”54  Things have changed for the better, but 
perhaps not enough.  A Republican strategist recently told the New 
York Times that the “Republican party needs to stop pandering to” rac-
ism.55  A recent report on focus groups conducted with committed Re-
publican voters by Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg found that 
“while few explicitly talk about Obama in racial terms, the base sup-
porters are very conscious of being white in a country with growing 
minorities.  Their party is losing to a Democratic Party of big govern-
ment whose goal is to expand programs that mainly benefit minorities.  
Race remains very much alive in the politics of the Republican  
Party.”56 
IV.  A NEW STANDARD BEYOND RACE OR PARTY 
As the earlier sections demonstrated, race and party are inter-
twined, especially in the South, but the legal standard is bifurcated.  If 
a plaintiff can raise a statutory Voting Rights Act or constitutional 
race-based claim under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, the 
claim may well succeed.  But claims of party discrimination go un-
checked.  In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,57 a voter 
identification case, for example, Judge Posner held that the Democratic 
Party had standing to contest Indiana’s law because the law was going 
to make it harder to get Democratic voters to the polls — but that the 
discrimination did not render the law unconstitutional.58  It did not 
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matter to the Seventh Circuit majority, or later to the Supreme Court, 
that this was a law was aimed at Democrats.  As Judge Evans de-
clared in dissent, “Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter 
photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-
day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”59 
This bifurcation puts courts to an either/or choice: in the redistrict-
ing cases, if “partisan” factors predominate in the legislature then those 
challenging the proposed district lines lose, but if “racial” factors pre-
dominate they win.  In the case of North Carolina’s new voter law, 
even if opponents can prove a bad “partisan” intent in passage of the 
law, they likely will still lose if the court accepts North Carolina’s  
posited-but-not-proven state interests, but if opponents can prove “ra-
cial” intent, they likely will win. 
Worse, the focus on race requires courts to make decisions about 
what is in legislators’ hearts: is there a racist intent? That question 
puts off some people who would otherwise be sympathetic to the ar-
gument that states should not impose laws which make it harder to 
register and vote for no good reason.  A search for racist intent is not 
the most productive way to think of these issues.  Instead, we need to 
question the assumption that it is permissible outside the redistricting 
context to discriminate on the basis of party. 
It is understandable why the Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
set out a workable standard for policing partisan gerrymandering 
claims in cases from Bandemer to Vieth to Easley: it is legitimate to 
have some consideration of party in drawing district lines, if only to 
make sure that those drawing district lines group together people with 
similar views and outlooks.  But it is not so difficult to separate per-
missible from impermissible consideration of party outside the redis-
tricting context.  When it comes to the rules for running our elections 
(as opposed to rules for constructing our legislative districts), there is a 
neutral standard against which we can judge election laws: election 
rules should be crafted so that all eligible voters — but only eligible 
voters — can easily register and cast a vote which will be accurately 
counted. 
In reviewing laws which impose burdens on voters, courts should 
adopt something along the lines of the “strict scrutiny light” standard 
which Judge Evans advanced in his Seventh Circuit Crawford dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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sent.60  When a legislature passes an election-administration law dis-
criminating against a party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters, 
courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause to require the legislature to produce real and substantial evi-
dence that it has a good reason for burdening voters and that its 
means are closely connected to achieving those ends.  This approach 
would not require delving into the motives of legislators to determine 
if they were merely self-interested and had passed laws to hurt the 
other party,61 as opposed to being motivated by a desire to prevent 
fraud, save money, or instill voter confidence.  Instead, evidence of 
such intent should prompt courts to look skeptically upon asserted 
state interests unsupported by actual evidence. 
When it comes to state voter identification laws, for example, the 
state would have to show that impersonation voter fraud is a real 
problem, that a photo identification requirement is a reasonably neces-
sary means to solve the problem, and that voters would not be over-
burdened by the requirement given the nature and extent of the state’s 
interest.  A law limiting absentee balloting, for example, would be eas-
ier to sustain than a voter identification law, because of the more ex-
tensive evidence of vote buying connected with the use of such bal-
lots.62 
An equal protection standard which requires substantial evidence 
justifying a burden on voters before a law would be considered consti-
tutional applies beyond voter identification.  Think of North Caroli-
na’s cutbacks in early voting or the failure to count wrong precinct 
ballots.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled 
against Ohio on both of these issues in the 2012 election season.63  The 
fact that the Republican legislature passed the cutbacks over strenuous 
Democratic objections may have raised the judges’ concerns. 
One panel of the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio could not, absent a 
good reason, cut back early voting for all voters except for military 
voters — who could, but need not, be given extra early voting days by 
local election boards.64  While the majority rule concerned discrimina-
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tion between classes of voters, both the district court65 and concurring 
Judge White on the Sixth Circuit66 focused on the fact that Ohio fixed 
its long-line problem in 2008 by extending early voting, and these 
judges feared that eliminating early voting in 2012 would have made 
things worse for voters.  Under Judge White’s standard, the Equal 
Protection Clause would prevent a state from making things worse for 
voters without good reason once it has made them better.67 
A different, and quite conservative, Sixth Circuit panel held that 
Ohio could not disenfranchise voters who cast their votes in the wrong 
precinct because of pollworker error.68  For example, the record 
showed that some Ohio voters were disenfranchised because poll 
workers could not determine whether the numerical portion of a regis-
trant’s address contained an odd or even number.69  The court held the 
disenfranchisement caused by poll worker error demonstrated likely 
success on the merits under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses.70 
The precise contours of judicial protection for voters remains to be 
worked out.  Applying a broader voter-protection standard as in Judge 
Evans’ Crawford dissent or the Sixth Circuit provisional ballot case, or 
even a nonretrogression standard as in Judge White’s concurrence in 
the early-voting case, could solve some of the problems of the Voting 
Wars and discrimination against minority voters simultaneously: if a 
state deviates from sound election administration practices, or imposes 
rules which increase burdens on voters, the state could not defend do-
ing so on grounds that the law is meant to discriminate against Demo-
cratic voters.  Nor could the state defend it with conjecture about sup-
posed but unproven harms.  Instead, a state should have to justify the 
law with reasonable, nondiscriminatory reasons supported by substan-
tial evidence.  It is time to extend election administration precedent in 
this voter-protective way that protects everyone from students to the 
elderly and all in-between.71 
Some may reject my argument because it does not give race a suffi-
ciently explicit role in policing elections.  But it is unrealistic to expect 
the current Supreme Court to endorse laws policing subtle racial dis-
crimination in voting.  The stronger claim before this Supreme Court 
is to protect the voting process from partisan manipulation. 
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Despite Crawford, and its acceptance of the state’s purported but 
unproven interest in preventing voter impersonation fraud,72 there is 
some reason to think that courts seeing the new Republican legislative 
overreach on voting laws are becoming amenable to stricter scrutiny 
for laws burdening voters.73  Consider Judge Posner’s turnabout on 
voter identification laws.  Or consider what Justice Kennedy said in 
the Vieth partisan gerrymandering case: “If a State passed an enact-
ment that declared ‘All future apportionment shall be drawn so as 
most to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective representation, 
though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles,’ we would 
surely conclude the Constitution had been violated.”74  Justice  
Kennedy’s principle is close to the reality of Texas’s and North Caroli-
na’s recent voting laws: they appear to have been enacted to burden 
the Democratic Party’s rights to fair and effective representation.  In-
deed, preferring one party for no good reason in election administra-
tion is akin to awarding patronage jobs based upon partisan affilia-
tion, a practice which the Court has held violates the First 
Amendment.75  There is simply no logical relation between party affil-
iation and the government choice. 
Some may reject my argument because it puts a thumb on the scale 
favoring voters, contending that election “integrity” should be a para-
mount value over preventing disenfranchisement.  I do not reject in-
tegrity as a value but argue it should be proven and not simply posit-
ed, especially when many of the posited reasons appear pretextual.  A 
rule making absentee balloting harder, for example, given ample evi-
dence of absentee ballot fraud could well be justified under my stan-
dard despite the burden on voters who prefer the convenience of ab-
sentee voting.  But a rule cutting back on early voting days (but 
keeping the same number of voting hours) would not be sustained ab-
sent a good reason grounded in election administration to do so. 
My proposed rule would apply nationwide, not just to those states 
with a history of discrimination in voting.  But I suspect that, thanks 
to Shelby County, there will be more attempts to game the system in 
formerly covered states, and that courts stepping in to require sound 
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election administration will also be greatly helping the position of mi-
nority voters.  Consider, for example, the City of Augusta, Georgia, 
which announced soon after the Shelby County decision that it might 
move Election Day to the summer,76 just as Democrats did in North 
Carolina in 1898.  There is no legitimate reason to move an election to 
a time when many voters are away from home. 
Finally, some may argue that the Court is unlikely to find a consti-
tutional violation when a state favors one party in its election admin-
istration, given that the Court has allowed states to favor incumbents 
in redistricting and to protect the two-party system from competition.77  
No case, however, has said that states can stack the rules about the 
casting and counting of votes — the most basic election laws — to 
promote one major party over that of another.  The next step is for 
courts to recognize that states often make voting rules for partisan rea-
sons under the pretext of following sound election administration  
practices. 
Back in 1900, North Carolina resolved its election administration 
disputes with violence, intimidation, and ballot-box stuffing.  We are 
mercifully no longer at that stage and I don’t expect we will ever be 
there again.  North Carolina’s new law is not that.  But we need to do 
more to protect all voters when states take steps which make it harder, 
for no good reason, for some voters to exercise the precious right to 
vote. 
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